• Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive
1 1

Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive

Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive

9781647123260

$62.27 AUD
$71.99 AUD $62.27 AUD
Sale Sold out
Taxes included. Shipping calculated at checkout.

A fresh perspective on statecraft in the cyber domain



The idea of “cyber war” has played a dominant role in both academic and popular discourse concerning the nature of statecraft in the cyber domain. However, this lens of war and its expectations for death and destruction may distort rather than help clarify the nature of cyber competition and conflict. Are cyber activities actually more like an intelligence contest, where both states and nonstate actors grapple for information advantage below the threshold of war?



In Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive, Robert Chesney and Max Smeets argue that reframing cyber competition as an intelligence contest will improve our ability to analyze and strategize about cyber events and policy. The contributors to this volume debate the logics and implications of this reframing. They examine this intelligence concept across several areas of cyber security policy and in different national contexts. Taken as a whole, the chapters give rise to a unique dialogue, illustrating areas of agreement and disagreement among leading experts and placing all of it in conversation with the larger fields of international relations and intelligence studies.



Deter, Disrupt, or Deceive is a must read because it offers a new way for scholars, practitioners, and students to understand statecraft in the cyber domain.


About the Author

<p><strong>Robert Chesney</strong> is the Dean of the University of Texas School of Law, where he also holds the James A. Baker III Chair in the Rule of Law and World Affairs. He is also a co-founder of and contributor to the blog Lawfare and co-host of the National Security Law Podcast.<br /><br><br /><br><strong>Max Smeets</strong> is a senior researcher at the Center for Security Studies at ETH Zurich and Director of the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative.</p><br>

Table of Content

<p>Foreword<br /><br>Amy Zegart<br /><br><br /><br>Preface<br /><br>Robert Chesney and Max Smeets<br /><br><br /><br>Introduction<br /><br>Robert Chesney and Max Smeets<br /><br><br /><br>Part I: A Theoretical Debate<br /><br>1. The Elements of an Intelligence Contest<br /><br>Joshua Rovner<br /><br><br /><br>2. The Character of Strategic Cyberspace Competition and the Role of Ideology<br /><br>Michael Warner<br /><br><br /><br>3. Hidden Dangers in the American Military Solution to a Large-Scale Intelligence Problem<br /><br>Jon R. Lindsay<br /><br><br /><br>4. Secrecy in Strategy<br /><br>Lennart Maschmeyer<br /><br><br /><br>5. Cyber Persistence, Intelligence Contests, and Strategic Competition<br /><br>Michael Fischerkeller & Richard Harknett<br /><br><br /><br>6. The United States and Legitimizing Rules of the Game<br /><br>Steven Loleski<br /><br><br /><br>Part II: Country Case Studies<br /><br>7. A Chinese Perspective on the New Intelligence Framework to Understand National Competition in Cyberspace<br /><br>Lyu Jinghua<br /><br><br /><br>8. Russia’s Holistic Conceptual Framework for Cyber Activity<br /><br>Valeriy Akimenko and Keir Giles<br /><br><br /><br>9. The Development of United Kingdom’s Cyber Posture<br /><br>Ciaran Martin<br /><br><br /><br>Part III: Nonstate Actors<br /><br>10. Private Actors and the Intelligence Contest in Cyber Conflict<br /><br>JD Work<br /><br><br /><br>11. Taking Non-State Actors Seriously (No, Seriously)<br /><br>Nina A. Kollars<br /><br><br /><br>Conclusion<br /><br>Robert Chesney and Max Smeets<br /><br><br /><br>Notes<br /><br>Index<br /><br>List of Contributors</p><br>
View full details